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BALANCING PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN 
THE AUSTRALIAN PASSPORT SYSTEM 
STEVEN R CLARK*
Passports are government-issued identification documents. They provide 
evidence of identity and citizenship, facilitating international travel and 
national security measures. This places them at the centre of debates 
regarding the balance between an individual’s privacy and the security of 
the community. Understanding the technologies used to implement passport 
systems can shift the discussion from privacy versus security, towards 
privacy and security — enhancing both. This article reviews these issues 
from the perspective of existing laws and future policy-making. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary passports have ancient antecedents, but their current form came 
into existence in the 1920s through the influence of the League of Nations.1 
After the Great War, nations began to require ‘documentary substantiation of 
identity used to register and keep watch over aliens’.2
The document has evolved over the past century, along with changes in 
international relations and shifts in the security interests of nations. New 
technologies have been exploited to increase the security and reliability of 
these documents as a means to verify identity. Australia’s current passports 
and passport laws are no exception, indeed Australia has been an active 
 By 1929, the passport 
had become standardised, along with an increasingly bureaucratised and 
securitised regime of population movement. 
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1 Jane Doulman and David Lee, Every Assistance & Protection: A History of the Australian 
Passport (Federation Press, 2008) 91. 
2 John Torpey, ‘World War One and the Birth of the Passport System’ in Jane Caplan and John 
Torpey (eds), Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the 
Modern World (Princeton University Press, 2001) 269–70.  
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participant in the development and implementation of international passport 
standards. 
From the 1960s onwards, with rising numbers of citizens travelling by air, 
automation of passport processing became increasingly attractive. In 1978 the 
international community settled a standard for a new Machine Readable 
Passport (MRP).3 An active participant in the MRP program, Australia 
implemented this standard in 1983, introducing one of the first machine 
readable passports.4
It was these 1983-style Australian passports that were compromised as part of 
the assassination of Hamas’ Mahmud Abdel Rauf al-Mabhuh in Dubai on 
20 January 2010. The Australian passports of Nicole Sandra McCabe, Adam 
Marcus Korman and Joshua Daniel Bruce were used by members of the 
Israeli Secret Service team to enter Dubai.
 
5
The Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, was quick to reassure Australians that 
the security of Australian passports had improved significantly since 2003, 
when these passports had been issued.
 Investigations by the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Passport Office (APO) soon 
established that the three Australian passports had either been duplicated or 
altered. 
6 Several persons came forward at the 
time, claiming that Israeli agents had used Australian passports many times 
prior to January 2010,7 and that the Australian government had ignored their 
warnings.8 Both claims were denied by the Australian government.9
                                                 
3 International Civil Aviation Organisation, Doc 9303: A Passport with Machine Readable 
Capability (1980). 
 
4 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 192–3.  
5 Ronen Bergman, ‘The Dubai Job’, GQ (online) January 2011 <http://www.gq.com/news-
politics/big-issues/201101/the-dubai-job-mossad-assassination-hamas>. 
6 Joe Kelly, ‘Australian Passports in Hamas Hit Duplicated or Altered, Stephen Smith Says’, 
The Australian (online), 25 February 2010 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/australian-
passports-in-hamas-hit-duplicated-or-altered-stephen-smith-says/story-e6frg6n6-
1225834232594>. 
7 ‘Israeli Spy Agency Mossad Regularly Faked Australian Passports: Ex-Agent’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 26 February 2010 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/israeli-spy-
agency-mossad-regularly-faked-australian-passports-exagent-20100226-p8om.html>. 
8 Mark Dodd and Paul Maley, ‘Warning on Passport Forgery Ignored, Says Former Diplomat’, 
The Australian (online), 26 February 2010 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-
affairs/defence/warning-on-passport-forgery-ignored-says-former-diplomat/story-e6frg8yo-
1225834538957>. 
9 Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, the older MRP documents are easily compromised. On 1 July 
2010, Victoria Police raided a house in the Melbourne suburb of Brooklyn as 
part of an ongoing investigation into an alleged ‘war’ between two rival crime 
families. They uncovered firearms, ammunition, and more than thirty blank 
passports on the property. Members of the Chaouk family were charged with 
related offences.10
When it introduced its new biometric passport in 2005, the Australian 
government hailed it as an improvement upon the original MRP documents.
 
11
This article examines the key legal and technological milestones in the recent 
history of the Australian passport. The emphasis in the 1970s was on the 
application of technologies to improve the flow of international passengers. A 
series of royal commissions into drug smuggling shifted this emphasis in the 
1980s to improving the integrity of the passport issuing process. The Machine 
Readable Passport enabled, for the first time, a direct link between a physical 
passport document and an electronic record of the facts relating to it. This 
tightened the security of the passport system, and enhanced its potential 
usefulness to law enforcement internationally. 
 
Biometric passports were commended for being more difficult to counterfeit, 
better integrated with passport databases, and for enabling a broader range of 
data interactions. The biometric passport has features that make it 
significantly more secure than previous passports, but also a greater threat to 
privacy. 
The possibility of expanding this connection to enable real-time identification 
of persons-of-interest via their use of their passports as they travel was viewed 
as the next logical step. However, it would not be until the first years of the 
twenty-first century that the technological means to ‘physically’ connect a 
traveller with their passport (via a biometric), and thus to an electronic record, 
became feasible. This coincided with a marked increase in national security 
concerns following the events of 11 September 2001. This confluence of 
events raises some important questions regarding the relative value placed 
upon privacy and security within new biometric passport systems. 
                                                 
10 Elissa Hunt, ‘More Charges for Chaouk Brothers’, Herald Sun (online), 26 August 2010 
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/more-charges-for-chaouk-brothers/story-
e6frf7kx-1225910418826>; Elissa Hunt, ‘Omar Chaouk, Held after Police Raid on Brooklyn 
Home, Freed on Bail’, The Herald Sun (online), 12 July 2010 
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/omar-chaouk-held-after-police-raid-on-brooklyn-home-
freed-on-bail/story-e6frf7jo-1225890728582>. 
11 Department of Foreign Affairs (Cth), ‘Australia Launches ePassports’ (Media Release, 25 
October 2005) <http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2005/fa132_05.html>.  
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II THE INTRODUCTION OF MACHINE READABLE 
PASSPORTS 
A false passport was an essential prerequisite to a drug smuggling career in 
the 1970s. Passengers and goods were subjected to an elaborate and expensive 
customs screening process. This process utilised a watch-list of names, and a 
general suspicion of anyone who travelled to, or through, drug-producing 
regions. The screening process was also important in interdicting a range of 
criminal activities beyond drug smuggling, including terrorism, illegal 
immigration, and evasion of health and quarantine restrictions. This regime 
was easily circumvented by Australians travelling on fraudulently obtained 
but valid passports.12
The Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs (ARCID) (‘the 
Williams Royal Commission’) was established in October 1977 to investigate 
the importation and trafficking of illegal drugs and the connections between 
drugs and other organised crime in Australia. In its report, the Commission 
estimated the number of heroin addicts in Australia at the time to be between 
14 200 and 20 300 persons.
 
13 The main sources of the drugs were the Golden 
Triangle (Thailand-Burma-Laos), the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan-Pakistan-
Iran), and the Bekka Valley of Lebanon. Almost all the heroin on sale in 
Australia was arriving by air, carried by drug couriers in kilogram 
quantities.14
This was made possible by the use of multiple and false passports. The use of 
false passports was well known, with several significant cases widely reported 
in the years prior to the Williams Commission. The Commission’s final report 
included several recommendations regarding passport applications: that they 
should be made in person; and that procedures for the identification of 
applicants and the provision of birth certificates should be changed.
 
15
These findings prompted the then Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, to 
establish a special judicial enquiry with the powers of a royal commission.
 
16
                                                 
12 Commonwealth, Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, Passports: Interim 
Report No 2 (1982). 
 
On 25 June 1981, the Commonwealth, Queensland, Victorian and New South 
13 Commonwealth, Australian Royal Comission of Inquiry into Drugs, Report (1980) D7.   
14 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 195–6. 
15 Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs, above n 13, B279 (Recommendations 
89, 90, 91 and 93) and D102, referred to by Commissioner Stewart in Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, above n 12, 14–15.     
16 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 196. 
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Wales governments established the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug 
Trafficking. Justice Donald Stewart of the NSW Supreme Court was 
empowered to inquire into the drug trafficking and associated activities of 
Terrance John Clark and his associates. In particular, the Commissioner was 
to inquire into their ‘nature and extent’, ‘the identity and involvement of 
[associated] persons’, their ‘methods of operation’ and their use of ‘banking, 
financial and other institutions’.17 Also of interest was whether Clark or his 
associates obtained information from government officials, or interfered with 
the course of justice.18
The Stewart Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking (Stewart 
Royal Commission) spent much of its time examining how criminals were 
abusing the Australian passport system. Justice Stewart set out the scale of the 
abuse of the system in detail in Interim Report No 2,
 
19 presented to the 
Governor-General and the Governors of NSW, Queensland and Victoria on 
17 May 1982.20
A False Passports 
 
False passports generally only come to light when the bearer is charged with a 
serious offence. This has always been the case. Neither the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
(DIEA) or the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were able to provide details to 
the Stewart Royal Commission regarding the number of false Australian 
passports discovered by any of the agencies.21
When questioned by the Stewart Royal Commission, the DFA argued in its 
defence that its primary concern was the issuing of genuine passports, and that 
it was not involved in the investigation of fraudulent passports. The 
Department had no information regarding the numbers of fraudulently altered 
passports, the nature of any alterations, nor the numbers of counterfeit 
passports detected. The DIEA was also unable to furnish the Stewart Royal 
Commission with information from the time it had administered the passport 
 
                                                 
17 Ibid 97. 
18 Ibid 98. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 196. 
21 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, above n 12, 43. 
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system.22
The use of fraudulently obtained passports by drug smugglers had been 
identified as early as 1966, when three former NSW police officers, John 
Wesley Egan, Harry Ikin and Murray Stewart Riley, were caught smuggling 
heroin from South East Asia into Australia and the USA.
 It also became apparent that there had been a lack of communication 
between the departments and law enforcement agencies. 
23 By the time 
Commissioner Williams began taking evidence for ARCID ten years later, the 
practice had become more common. Commissioner Stewart was in no doubt 
that it was even more widespread by the time he began his inquiry in 1981.24
B Samir Makary 
 
Commissioner Stewart became so concerned about failures to address the 
availability of false passports that he devoted his second interim report to the 
subject. To illustrate the depth of the problem, he recounts the following story 
of Samir Makary.25
On 27 October 1981, police officers,
 Makary had come to the attention of the Royal 
Commission, and had been identified in the Commission’s first interim report. 
Nevertheless, Makary was able to evade prosecution by obtaining a false 
Australian passport.  
26 acting on the confidential first interim 
report of the Stewart Royal Commission, arrested Samir Makary, a Lebanese 
national, in Northmead in the western suburbs of Sydney. He had in his 
possession almost four hundred grams of what appeared to be high grade 
heroin. A similar quantity of the drug was found at his Granville home. 
Chemical analysis later confirmed that Makary was in possession of 743.9 
grams of 52 per cent pure heroin of Middle Eastern origin.27
Makary appeared before the Chief Magistrate of New South Wales at Sydney 
on 28 October 1981. Bail was refused in the first instance, but this was 
overturned on appeal by Mr Justice Yeldham of the Supreme Court of New 
 
                                                 
22 The DIEA was also unable to furnish an answer to either the Minister for Foreign Affairs nor 
the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. For example, see question on notice in 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 May 1981, 2859 
(Tony Street, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
23 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, above n 12, 43. 
24 Ibid 41–7. 
25 Ibid 41–2. 
26 Members of the Commonwealth–State Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking, assisted by the 
New South Wales Police Drug Squad and Air Wing. 
27 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, above n 12, 41. 
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South Wales. Bail was set at $75 000, with the conditions that Makary surrender 
his passport, not approach international airports, and report to the Granville 
police station every morning and evening. 
On 4 December 1981, Makary pleaded guilty before a magistrate and was 
committed for sentencing by the District Court of New South Wales on  
18 December 1981. The prosecution failed to apply for review of his bail, 
allowing him to walk out of the court. Makary’s counsel appeared on his 
behalf at the December 18 hearing, informing the court that Makary was in 
hospital. Judge Cameron-Smith remanded Makary to appear before the Court 
on 15 January 1982, and ordered the issue of a warrant to lie in the Court 
office, to be executed should he not appear. 
On 15 January 1982, Makary’s counsel again appeared on his behalf, this time 
to advise Judge Ward that he had no further instructions. Police immediately 
sought to execute the warrant, but without success. Makary had last reported 
to the Granville police station on the morning of 13 January 1982. He left 
Australia just after midday the same day on a Yugoslavian aircraft, heading to 
Damascus via Dubai.28
When police searched Makary’s home, they found six passport-sized photos 
of him in a packet. The photographer recalled taking eight photos of Makary 
in late December 1981 or early January 1982. Five police officers then began 
manually searching through the 15 000 passport applications made at the Sydney 
Passports Office between 1 December 1981 and 15 January 1982. They 
eventually discovered an application with Makary’s photograph attached. 
 
Makary had applied for a passport on 23 December 1981 in the name of 
Kevin William Harris, date of birth 18 July 1951. The application listed 
William Harris, of 44 Brain Avenue, Lurnea, as the father. A passport was 
issued on 4 January 1982, and collected by a travel agent on 12 January. 
Police obtained a birth certificate for Kevin William Harris who was born on 
18 July 1951. They also obtained a death certificate dated 16 August 1952, 
which indicated that he had died aged less than 13 months. They learned that 
an earlier application for a copy of the birth certificate had been made in the 
name of William Harris, as the father of Kevin William Harris, claiming it 
was required for probate purposes. That application was accompanied by a 
typewritten letter authorising an Alfred Wilhelm Gruner to collect a birth 
certificate on behalf of William Harris. Gruner proved to be an entirely 
fictitious alias. The letter was well phrased, and the handwriting on the 
                                                 
28 Ibid 42. 
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document was similar to the signature of the travel agent on similar 
documents regarding arrangements to collect Makary’s false passport.29
The passport application also included a certificate of identity endorsed by a 
William Victor Cook, JP, bank officer, retired. The telephone book listed a 
WV Cook JP. When Wilfred Vincent Cook JP, stock and station agent, was 
interviewed by police, he stated that he had no knowledge of the matter. It 
was assumed that his name had been selected from the phone book because of 
the ‘JP’ suffix. 
 
Police also visited the Church of England cemetery at Woronora where Kevin 
William Harris’s death certificate indicated he had been buried. His burial was 
marked by a simple wooden cross without inscription. It was clear that 
Makary had not obtained Kevin William Harris’s details from the cemetery. 
This avenue of inquiry was suggested by Frederick Forsyth’s 1971 novel The 
Day of the Jackal, which had been made into a movie in 1973. In the novel 
(set in 1963), the eponymous character ‘The Jackal’ is an assassin hired to kill 
Charles de Gaulle, then President of France. He acquires a false passport by 
visiting a cemetery and applying for the birth certificate of a deceased child, 
using details from the child’s gravestone. This is then used to apply for a 
passport in the child’s name. 
The 32 year old Lebanese national, who had arrived in Australia less than 10 
years earlier, was able to obtain an Australian passport upon claiming to have 
been born in Australia 30 years previously to William Harris and Lorna 
Harris. The Passports Office at the time was more concerned with protecting 
the privacy of applicants and providing a timely and convenient service than 
securing the process from abuse. Makary was just one in a long line of 
criminals (and others) reaching back at least to the 1960s who had been able 
to obtain a valid, but false, Australian passport. 
III REFORMING PASSPORT LAW AND PROCESSES 
In the thirty years following the introduction of the Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth), Australians could get a passport on proof of 
citizenship and proof of identity. Citizenship could be proved by a birth 
certificate or certificate of naturalisation. Proof of identity was furnished by a 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
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Certificate Regarding Applicant (CRA), signed by a qualified person,30 
certifying that the two photos supplied with the application were photos of the 
applicant. Prior to the Stewart Royal Commission, information supplied to 
passport issuing officers by applicants — or ‘certifiers of identity’ — was 
rarely independently verified.31 Indeed, it was a widely held opinion amongst 
government officials (including AFP officers), that many travel agents and 
passport applicants regarded the CRA to be ‘a joke’.32
During the 1970s, increasing computerisation had improved passport issuing 
processes. In 1976, passport records which had been held at state offices were 
centralised, making it easier to cross-check applications. Index card records 
were computerised in 1978. By 1980, every passport-issuing officer in 
Australia had online access to a central computer, preventing the issue of 
passports with the same name and date of birth as one already issued.
 
33
However, prior to the implementation of the Stewart Royal Commission 
reforms, only a third of applications were made at Passport Offices in person. 
The other two thirds were made by mail or on behalf of the applicant by travel 
agents (and others). Stewart reflected on the irony of tax payers funding 
expensive systems designed to prevent criminality, while at the same time 
funding a passport system that readily enabled criminals to circumvent those 
very systems with impunity.
 
34
The Stewart Commission uncovered three methods used to obtain a false 
passport:
 
35
1. Application using the birth certificate of a deceased person; 
   
2. Application using a borrowed, bought or stolen birth certificate of a 
living person;36
                                                 
30 Qualified persons included magistrates, justices of the peace, solicitors, accountants, medical 
practitioners, chartered engineers, members of parliament, union officials, bank managers, 
teachers, and managers. 
 
31 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, above n 12, 63. 
32 Doulman, above n 2, 197–8. 
33 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1982, 3079 
(Tony Street, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
34 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, above n 12, 4X and again in Donald 
Stewart, Recollections of an Unreasonable Man: From the Beat to the Bench (ABC Books, 
2007) 157–8. 
35 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 198–9. These three summarise the five methods reported by the 
Commission. 
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3. Collusion with an officer in the Passport Office, who would remove 
the physical file regarding the application after the passport was 
issued. 
The Passport Office retained documentation for each passport application and 
passport issue: the application form; a check sheet; the application’s second 
photo (the first being attached to the passport); a register of passport numbers; 
the name of the person to whom the passport was issued; and other 
particulars. If this ‘dossier’ were removed from the files, the Office had no 
other record of how the valid passport came to be issued. Thus, if questioned, 
the Office could only confirm that the passport had been issued.37
Sir Edward Williams’s Australian Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drugs 
(ARCID) had recommended only a few years earlier that passport applicants 
ought to present in person to a Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office.
 
38 
The DFA considered this impractical. With two thirds of applications made by 
mail or via an agent, the proposal would add 274 000 applicants to the 148 000 
who had presented themselves during 1979 alone. ‘The Stewart Royal 
Commission doubted whether the department appreciated the scale of the 
abuse of the system that was taking place.’39
The DFA argued that the increased volume of applications would mean that 
documents could receive only the briefest of scrutiny by officers. Most 
documents of identity were beyond the Department’s control, and were 
readily available. False documents presented for a passport application would 
pass casual scrutiny with little difficulty. But this position taken by the DFA 
dismissed the possibility that checks could dissuade some from attempting 
fraud, and might catch others who made an attempt. 
 
The Stewart Royal Commission set out 40 recommendations for reforms to 
the passport system to improve its integrity and security. In particular it 
recommended that: 
                                                                                                                    
36 This was risky unless you knew the person would never, and had never, applied for a 
passport. 
37 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 199. 
38 The ARCID Recommendation 89 reads: ‘As a general rule, applicants for passports should 
be required ... to present themselves in person at an office of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and to produce there any supporting documentation required to satisfy the issuing 
officer as to their identity’: quoted by Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, 
above n 12, 15.   
39 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 200. See also Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug 
Trafficking, above n 12, 41: ‘This Commission has grave doubt as to whether the Department 
really appreciates how serious the present position is.’ 
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• Applicants should apply at a Passport Office in person, unless 
exempted; 
• Passports only be issued to Australian citizens;40
• Birth certificates alone no longer be accepted as sufficient proof of 
identity; 
 
• Passports no longer be issued to travel agents or other agents. 
It also recommended: 
• The establishment of a Passports Committee as an interdepartmental 
standing committee to supervise the security of Australian Passports 
and visas, and other passports and documents used to enter Australia; 
• The introduction of legislation in each State requiring the registration 
of any change of name (whether by choice, marriage, or adoption) 
with the relevant Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (RBDM); 
and 
• The upgrading of the classification of the staff in the Passports Office, 
and their office accommodation.41
In response, the DFA established an internal working party to assess the 
options available for processing passport applications and issuing travel 
documents. The Department also established a Passports Committee to advise 
the Minister. The DFA provided the chair, with other members drawn from 
the Customs Service; the Australian Federal Police (AFP); the Attorney-
General’s Department (AGD); the Postal Commission; the Australian 
Government Publishing Service (AGPS); the Australian Bureau of Criminal 
Intelligence (ABCI); the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
(DIEA); and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC).
 
42
There were criticisms within the DFA that the Stewart Royal Commission had 
not considered the full picture. J R Kelso, former Director of Passport 
Operations, wrote in an internal document: 
 
                                                 
40 British subjects, regardless of nationality, until that time could apply for and be issued with 
an Australian passport. 
41 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking, above n 12, 89–94. 
42 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 201–2. 
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Its observations on passports were those undertaken from what might 
broadly be described as a control and enforcement perspective. But there are 
other important factors to be taken into account in any examination of the 
passports function. These include, for example, the rights of citizens to 
travel and hence to obtain passports, the extent to which it is appropriate to 
permit increased intrusions into privacy and to create inconvenience for 
individuals, the staffing and costing implications, etc.43
This view was supported by I G Bowden, First Assistant Secretary of the 
Consular, Information and Cultural Division: 
 
The passport function can never be used as a mechanism for enforcement 
and control, but rather as a beneficiary of other control procedures.44
Another sticking point for the Department was Commissioner Stewart’s 
proposal to create regional issuing agencies, outside the major cities. J A 
Benson, Assistant Secretary of the Executive Secretariat of the DFA was 
concerned that: 
 
[t]he recommendations make no reference to a balancing of the 
cost to society of these extra facilities against the expected social 
gain from what is likely to be no more than reduced ease of 
travel for drug traffickers.45
A National Identity System Proposal 
 
By 1982, the DFA considered that only a national identity system could 
deliver a robust passport system. But any such ‘ID system would have to be 
based on physiological characteristics such as finger printing, cell testing, 
blood typing, voice recognition combined with registration of the residence of 
all those who reside in Australia’.46
                                                 
43 Minute from J R Kelso to I G Bowden, 5 July 1982 (National Archive of Australia: A1838, 
1622/12/8/44 part 1) (emphasis added). 
 Of these, only fingerprinting could be 
reasonably automated using technologies available at the time. The strong 
association of fingerprinting with criminal processing would make this a ‘hard 
sell’. Other available biometric technologies (such as cell testing or voice 
44 Minute from I G Bowden, 13 August 1982 (National Archive of Australia: A1838, 
1622/12/8/44 part 1). 
45 J A Benson, Minute from J A Benson to T B McCarthy, Assistant Secretary, Consular Policy 
Branch, 28 Jun 1982 (National Archive of Australia: A1838, 1622/12/8/3 part 1) (1982). 
46 Minute from J R Kelso to I G Bowden, 5 July 1982 (National Archive of Australia: A1838, 
1622/12/8/44 part 1). 
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recognition) were time and resource intensive, and thus unsuitable for 
processing large numbers of applications, let alone timely immigration 
processing in concert with customs checks at entry points into Australia. 
There was an additional problem. The ancestors of most Australians were not 
living in Australia, and there was no common system of registration of births, 
deaths and marriages across the states and territories.47
The Department advised government ministers in July 1982 that any national 
identity system would be expensive to implement, difficult to administer, and 
likely to provoke political opposition.
 Taken together, this 
meant that there was no existing reliable and interoperable benchmark for 
establishing identity — founded upon either the person themselves, their 
ancestry, or the provenance of their identification documents — with which to 
address identification issues. 
48
it must be accepted that organisations which depend on securing the identity 
of people can never be sure that people cannot obtain benefits from 
government fraudulently and that determined people will be able to abuse 
the system. The Government in this case should accept that the passport 
system can never be perfect and should say so.
 However, the Department argued that, 
without one: 
49
The Minister for Foreign Affairs revisited the idea between 1985 and 1987, 
when the Hawke government proposed to introduce a national identity card 
for citizens and residents (the Australia Card). The card failed to win popular 
support and the idea was shelved. Had the Australia Card been introduced, the 
passport function may have been incorporated into a new Department of 
National Identity, along with other government identification systems to 
combat fraud in tax, health and welfare systems,
 
50 as it had been with the 
United Kingdom’s Office of Passports and Identity twenty years later.51
                                                 
47 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 202. 
 
48 Ibid 203. 
49 Note, ‘Suggested Approach to Ministers to SRC Report on Passports’, nd 1982 (National 
Archive of Australia: A1838, 1622/12/8/3 part 1). 
50 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 206. 
51 The new Coalition government in the UK put dismantling the Identity Card system front-
and-centre of its reform agenda, and has since done so. 
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B Passport Reforms 
On 8 December 1982, the Fraser government’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr A A (Tony) Street, announced that the government would address many of 
the Stewart Royal Commission’s main criticisms, while largely accepting his 
Department’s advice. He conceded that, whilst a national identity system 
based upon fingerprinting might be the most effective approach to addressing 
the shortcomings of existing identification processes, its ‘implications on our 
traditional way of life’ made it unattractive.52
The most significant change adopted by the government was to require 
applicants, from 1 October 1984, to attend in person before a passport officer. 
This would enable a trained officer to assess the identity documents and 
compare the photographs attached to the application with the applicant 
directly. 
 
Rather than establish more Passport Offices and create more passport 
commissioners, post offices would act as agencies.53 Post offices had several 
advantages: convenience for applicants; the fact that postmasters and senior 
postal clerks were already experienced in conducting interviews on an agency 
basis; the fact that post office staff could check the residential addresses of 
applicants; and the fact that the cost would be significantly less than 
establishing regional passport offices. Post office staff who handled an 
applicant’s mail at local post offices could readily establish the applicant’s 
bona fides. They could also cross-check passport applications and Certificates 
Regarding Applicants (CRAs) with electoral rolls, telephone directories, and 
other registers held at post offices.54
Additional identity checks were announced on 5 January 1982, including 
comparisons with electoral rolls and other records. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs began to contact applicants, and those certifying the 
applicant’s identity, by mail or telephone. The Department also required the 
identity of all applicants to be checked as thoroughly as possible before a 
passport was issued. 
 
 
                                                 
52 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1982, 3079 
(Tony Street, Minister for Foreign Affairs). Indeed such a radical programme was unlikely to 
assist Street, or the Liberals, at a future election. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 203–4. 
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The categories of persons able to certify the identity of applicants was 
restricted to: 
Members of Parliament — Federal and State; aldermen and councillors of 
municipal and shire councils; town clerks and secretaries; medical 
practitioners and dentists; judges, magistrates, clerks of petty sessions and 
clerks of court; school teachers of five years service; postmasters; police 
officers of the rank of sergeant and above and officers in charge of stations; 
officers of the armed services; ministers of religion designated as marriage 
celebrants; and Federal and State public servants of at least 10 years’ 
permanent service.55
This was considered to be wide enough that applicants should know at least 
one person within any one category, and to include people whose bona fides 
could be readily checked by the Passport Office and whose careers would be 
affected by fraudulent conduct.
 
56
Applicants were now required to provide a full birth certificate, showing their 
name at birth and the full names of both parents.
 
57 Photocopies of primary 
documents or birth extracts were no longer acceptable. In some states a person 
changing their name by Deed Poll could have a birth extract issued in their 
new name. To require a person’s name at birth established a ‘base name’ for 
computer records.58
The government increased resources for passport functions to address sharply 
increasing demand. Between May 1982 and June 1985, passport applications 
increased by 30 per cent. Sixty per cent of applications were lodged at post 
offices, which were taking on much of the work previously handled by travel 
agents. Over the same period, Passport Office staff increased from 192 to 263, 
including 51 document and identity investigators, to carry out the additional 
checks, reporting and accountability measures associated with the Stewart 
reforms.  
 
                                                 
55 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1982, 3079 
(Tony Street, Minister for Foreign Affairs). Conspicuously absent from this list were lawyers. 
56 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 205. 
57 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1982, 3079 
(Tony Street, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
58 This ‘base name’ was determined at the time of acquiring Australian citizenship: birth or 
naturalisation. 
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Table 1: Number of Australian Passports issued between 1982 and 1985 
Financial Year Passports Issued59
1982–1983 
 
520 884 
1983–1984 543 748 
1984–1985 673 748 
 
The reforms soon brought about measurable results. In 1985 the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) reported a significant decrease in fraudulent passports 
amongst detained criminals as compared with previous years, especially those 
on drug charges.60 A sub-committee of the Passports Committee examined 
140 cases of Australians imprisoned overseas. Eighty per cent were 
imprisoned for drug offences. Many had a history of incidents regarding 
passports (including losing more than one). In each case, the DFA was able to 
contact the next-of-kin and confirm identity. In their comprehensive history of 
the Australian Passport, Jane Doulman and David Lee report that only one 
person had been able to obtain a passport under a false identity under the new 
procedures. That person had a history of mental illness, and had established a 
second identity over the previous two years.61
The Australian High Commission in Wellington reported three cases where 
the new procedures had prevented a passport being issued in the name of a 
false identity. A single instance of obtaining an Australian passport under a 
false identity was short lived. A temporary 20-day passport was issued in 
Brazil to replace one reported stolen. The application was soon discovered to 
be false, and the bearer arrested in Australia. The bearer was also found to be 
holding three other passports in their name.
 
62
Commissioner Stewart was not convinced that the provision of consular 
services overseas was enough to require DFA administration of the passport 
system. He recommended that the passport function be transferred back to 
 
                                                 
59 Figures from Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 205.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Australian Passports Office, ‘Review of Passport Procedures’, internal departmental paper 
(1985). 
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DIEA,63 arguing that the essential qualification for a passport was Australian 
citizenship, and thus the supply of passports ought to be administered by 
DIEA.64 Some in the DFA supported the divesting of the passport function. 
However, the Consular and Passports Branch persuasively argued that 
Passport Offices were the public face of, and the only contact most 
Australians had with, the Department. Passport Offices were the ‘single best 
opportunity [for] the Minister and the department ... to maintain a sympathetic 
constituency in Australia amongst Australians’.65
In 1986, the Department again successfully defended its administration of 
passports: 
 
[T]he passports organisation is more efficient than it ever has been and in 
large part we ascribe this to the intra-departmental relationships of 
passports, legal, consular and communications computers. Issue of 
passports is essentially part of our overseas function ... The passports 
database is now substantially improved, the incidence of disclosed 
malpractice is very low, and we believe it is the government’s most accurate 
personal database.66
The tightening of controls surrounding the issuing of Australian passports 
significantly reduced misuse of the system. This not only improved the quality 
of the passport as a document for identification purposes; it also put in motion 
similar improvements to other identification documents. However, it also 
shifted the balance between privacy and security in the system in favour of 
security. This shift to an emphasis on security has accelerated since the events 
of 11 September 2001. 
 
IV INFLUENCE OF THE USA AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
Early on 11 September 2001 a group of Islamic terrorists affiliated with al-
Qaeda hijacked four commercial airliners in the United States of America 
(USA). They flew two into the World Trade Center buildings in New York 
                                                 
63 Recommendation: ‘38. While the determination of appropriate Commonwealth 
administrative arrangements is a matter for Ministers, the Commission is strongly of the view 
that Passport Offices should be part of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and 
not part of the Department of Foreign Affairs’: Royal Commission of Inquiry into Drug 
Trafficking, above n 12, 94. 
64 Ibid 70–3. 
65 Minute from R F Osborn (consultant), to J H Brook, First Assistant Secretary, Legal and 
Consular Division, 16 July 1985 (National Archives Australia: A1838, 1622/11/44 part 1). 
66 Minute from A D Campbell, Acting Secretary, to Bill Haydon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
nd 1986 (National Archive Australia: A1838, 1622/1/120 part 1). 
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City and one into the Pentagon Building. The fourth crashed in rural 
Pennsylvania — presumably heading to the White House. The World Trade 
Center buildings collapsed, and a total of 2973 people died.67
It was clear to many that terrorists were exploiting US immigration and border 
control mechanisms to operate inside the USA. Of the 48 foreign-born 
terrorists involved in plots between 1993–2001, 17 were naturalised US 
citizens or legal permanent residents; 16 were visiting on temporary visas; 3 
made asylum applications; and 12 had crossed the US border illegally.
 
68
The events of ‘9/11’ changed the way many nations thought about national 
security. Their security thinking moved from an emphasis on defence against 
foreign national armies towards defence against global(ised) terrorism. This 
blurred the lines between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security.
 
69
During the 1990s, the dictum of ‘out of sight, out of mind’ was used to 
address most societal insecurities. But the clandestine entry of alien terrorists 
and the presence of sleeper cells in the ‘homeland’ are threatening because of 
their invisibility. They are a spectre lurking in the shadows. Security now 
seemed to require policies that increased visibility rather than decreased it so 
that the entry of potentially dangerous individuals could be prevented.
 The desire for 
increased border protection measures and increased surveillance has had 
significant implications for passport systems worldwide. 
70 
Consequently, airline passenger data, immigration records and passports, 
telephone and email logs all became the focus of government surveillance.71
In October 2001, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act).
 
72
                                                 
67 United States of America, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States (2004) 552. 
 This increased 
68 Steven Camarota, ‘How the Terrorists Get In’ (2002) (149) The Public Interest 65, 67, 
drawing upon material from Steven Camarota, ‘The Open Door: How Militant Islamic 
Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993–2001’ (Center for Immigration 
Studies, 2002).  
69 Christopher Rudolph, National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United 
States and Western Europe since 1945 (Stanford University Press, 2006) 78. 
70 Ibid 79. 
71 David Lyon, Surveillance after September 11 (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003) 109. 
72 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272 
(2001). 
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several USA federal authorities’ powers to carry out surveillance and to detain 
suspected terrorists; laid out additional grounds to refuse entry to those 
suspected of involvement in terrorism; and expanded the legal definition of 
terrorist activities to include ‘material support’ for terrorists or terrorist 
organisations. It also required the President, within two years, to certify a 
biometric technology standard to enable the identification of aliens seeking to 
enter the USA.73
The following year, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
of 2002 (EBSVERA) was enacted. Amongst other provisions, it provided an 
additional incentive for international cooperation with a biometric standard: 
 
Not later than October 26, 2004, the government of each country that is 
designated to participate in the visa waiver program established under 
section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act shall certify, as a 
condition for designation or continuation of that designation, that it has a 
program to issue to its nationals machine-readable passports that are 
tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document authentication 
identifiers that comply with applicable biometric and document identifying 
standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization.74
In order for its citizens to continue to be eligible for visa-free entry into the 
USA, Australia would have to develop and implement a biometric passport. 
 
EBSVERA also led to an increase in the number of US immigration 
inspectors and investigators, and increased scrutiny of visa applications 
originating in countries suspected of supporting terrorism. A year after 9/11, 
the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) was 
implemented under EBSVERA, requiring all foreign male visitors from 
‘politically sensitive’ areas to register with authorities.75
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) program superseded NSEERS, which was discontinued on 27 April 
2011.
 
76
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
 US-VISIT requires a digitally scanned fingerprint and a digital 
74 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107-173, § 
303(c)(1), 116 Stat 543, 554 (2002) (emphasis added). 
75 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 209. 
76 US Department of Homeland Security, Important NSEERS Information, (20 May, 2011 
<http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/nseers/imp_nseers_info.xml> citing Removing 
Designated Countries From the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 
76 Fed Reg 23 830 (28 April, 2011). 
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photograph of all non-immigrant visa-holders. Their name and fingerprints are 
cross-checked with security databases before the visitor can enter the USA.77
The conditions imposed by the US for continued eligibility for its Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP) provided a significant impetus to countries such as 
Australia to develop and deploy a biometric passport. US-VISIT required that: 
 
• Passports issued or renewed before 26 October 2005 must be machine 
readable; 
• Passports issued or renewed after 26 October 2005 must be machine 
readable and contain a digitised photograph, or be biometric 
passports; 
• Passports issued or renewed after 26 October 2006 must be biometric 
passports. 
Visitors to the USA bearing passports which did not meet the relevant VWP 
criteria faced fingerprinting and other potentially invasive requirements before 
being allowed to pass passport control. 
V DEVELOPING A BIOMETRIC PASSPORT 
The changes to US passport and immigration laws and procedures introduced 
following 11 September 2001 increased the momentum within the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to settle upon a biometric 
passport standard. In fact, a Technical Working Group comprising 
representatives from Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the Russian 
Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the USA had been researching 
an appropriate standard since 1995.78
Traditional passports contain a simple recognition detail: a photograph. 
However, people are not good at comparing multiple pairs of similar-looking 
people with photographs. Various technologies have been, and are being, 
developed to replace fallible humans with machines. Biometric passports have 
 
                                                 
77 Christopher Rudolph, National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United 
States and Western Europe since 1945 (Stanford University Press, 2006) 80. 
78 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 210. 
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all the features of traditional passports, supplemented with a computer file 
incorporating ‘commonly known personal attributes (name, date of birth, sex 
and so on) and biometric data to enable machines to verify the identity of the 
passport holder’.79
Identity verification is generally reliant upon one of three processes. The first 
is the possession of a document (what you have) such as a driver’s licence, 
passport, or credit card; but these could be fraudulently obtained, stolen, lost, 
or used to create a false identity. The second is the possession of knowledge 
(what you know), such as a password or secret; though if it were too short or 
too simple, it might be easy to guess/crack, and if too long or too complex, too 
difficult to remember. The third is the use of biometrics: using a person’s own 
body (what you are) as validation of identity. This would generally be 
difficult to forge. Examples of biometric validation include comparison of 
fingerprints, facial recognition, hand geometry, and iris recognition. 
 
For the ICAO, biometric passports serve two main purposes: 
Verification — ‘confirming identity by comparing identity details of 
the person claiming to be a specific individual against details 
previously recorded on that individual’; and 
Identification — ‘determining possible identity by comparing identity 
details of the presenting person against details previously 
recorded on a number of living individuals’.80
Seven criteria were used by the ICAO to assess available technologies: 
 
1. Compatibility with enrolment requirements; 
2. Compatibility with Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) 
renewal requirements; 
3. Compatibility with MRTD machine-assisted identity verification 
requirements; 
4. Redundancy; 
5. Global public perception; 
                                                 
79 Ibid 214. 
80 Privacy International, Background on Biometric Passports, (30 March, 2004) Privacy 
International <https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/background-biometric-passports>. 
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6. Storage requirements; and 
7. Performance.81
The available biometric technologies were grouped into three categories, and 
then assessed against these criteria. 
 
Table 2: Compatibility of Biometric Technologies with ICAO Criteria 
 
Technology Compatibility 
Facial recognition > 85 per cent 
Fingerprints and irises near 65 per cent 
Signature, hand, and voice < 50 per cent 
 
In May 2003, the ICAO’s Air Transport Committee published a ‘blueprint’ 
for globally interoperable biometric passports and other travel documents. It 
was intended to balance expedited traveller flows with security requirements. 
The ICAO Technical Advisory Group on MRTDs recommended facial 
recognition as the globally interoperable biometric. It also suggested that this 
could be supplemented with fingerprint or iris recognition.82
Australia was active in the development of these international standards for 
biometric passports. Since 1995 it had been a member of the Technical 
Working Group responsible for assessing the feasibility and content of a 
technical standard. Between 2001 and 2005, the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs actively developed and tested a biometric passport.
 
83
                                                 
81 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 210–1. 
 
Research into the use of a facial biometric identifier to connect cardinal 
documents of identity (birth certificates, citizenship certificates) with their 
owner began in 2001. The Department hoped to tie the face of a passport 
applicant to a name on a cardinal document. This would enable the passport 
information systems to scan the Department’s considerable photographic 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid 211. 
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database84
A Criticism of Biometric Passports 
 and raise an alert if it detected an attempt by anyone to apply for a 
passport using false papers. 
The introduction of biometric passports coincided with increasing 
coordination of international police activities, and the practice of sending 
passenger data ahead of aircraft to destination airports to be compared against 
domestic watch lists.85
We are increasingly concerned that the biometric travel document initiative 
is part and parcel of a larger surveillance infrastructure for monitoring the 
movements of individuals globally.
 Critics have raised concerns about these practices and 
technologies — particularly on privacy grounds. Privacy International and the 
American Civil Liberties Union argue: 
86
Other critics are concerned that biometric data, such as fingerprints and face 
scans, being accumulated in massive databases, could become a precursor to 
mass surveillance;
 
87 or, worse, be used by nations to monitor their citizenry 
unfairly and inappropriately.88
David Lyons, Professor of Sociology at Queens University in Canada,
 
89 and 
founder of Privacy International,90
                                                 
84 Several million photographs of passport applicants. 
 is concerned that ‘personal data’ is 
crossing borders at an increasingly rapid rate. He argues that borders 
themselves have become ‘delocalised’, as efforts are made to check travellers 
before they reach physical borders or ports of entry. He is concerned that 
images and information regarding travellers now circulate through different 
databases, looping back and forth in commercial, policing and government 
networks. Surveillance records, originally kept on paper in filing cabinets and 
85 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 214. 
86 Open letter from Privacy International et al to the participants of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization 12th session of the Facilitation Division, 30 March 2004, 
<https://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/rpt/icaoletter.pdf>. 
87 Cath Everett, ‘Biometrics-based Surveillance: Big Brother or Vital Safeguard?’ (2009) 11 
Computer Fraud & Security 5; Marie-Helen Maras, ‘How to Catch a Terrorist: Is Mass 
Surveillance the Answer?’ (2010) 5(1) Journal of Applied Security Research 20; Christopher 
S Milligan, ‘Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy’ (1999) 9 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 295. 
88 British Broadcasting Corporation, Concern over Biometric Passports (30 March 2004) BBC 
News Technlogy <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3582461.stm>. 
89 Toronto, Ontario. 
90 An international non-government organisation. 
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dealing with data focused on persons in specific places, are now in digital 
form. They are now properly ‘globalized’, in the sense that they exist within 
patterns of global activity and social arrangements that are less constrained by 
geography than they used to be. Lyons contends that the ‘delocalized border’ 
is a prime example of globalised surveillance.91
Concerns have also been raised that biometric details could be stolen or 
cloned from passports.
 
92 Although extracting biometric data from the 
biometric passport would not itself enable a criminal to impersonate the 
holder without the holder’s biometric characteristics,93 it might be useful for 
other kinds of fraud.94 If third parties were to acquire the components for 
making a biometric passport, cloning becomes more attractive, and 
(potentially) more useful.95
Anticipating criticism that ePassport biometric details might be 
misappropriated by government officials, the Australian government 
explicitly linked the new passport system to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to 
prohibit government officials from collecting, using, or disclosing personal 
information except in the performance of their duties.
 
96
VI A MAJOR OVERHAUL OF AUSTRALIAN PASSPORT LAW 
 
The package of passports legislation will provide a modern legal structure 
to underpin our world-class passports system.97
In 2005 the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) replaced the venerable 
Passports Act 1938 (Cth). In his Second Reading Speech for the Australian 
 
                                                 
91 David Lyon, above n 71, 110. 
92 Steve Boggan, ‘“Fakeproof” e-Passport Is Cloned in Minutes’, The Times (online) 6 August 
2008 <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4467106.ece>; Tech.view, 
Have Chip, Will Travel (17 July 2009) The Economist <http://www. 
economist.com/node/14066895>. 
93 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 214. 
94 Ibid 216. 
95 Matthew Mosk, Matthew Cole, Brian Ross and John Solomon, Security of US Passports 
Called Into Question (14 June 2010) ABC World News <http://abcnews.go. 
com/Blotter/security-us-passports-called-question/story?id=10909092>; Patrice Poltzer, 
‘Thousands of UK Passports Stolen’ Time World (online), 28 July 2008 
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827501,00.html>. 
96 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 6 and 42–46. 
97 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 13 
(Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
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Passports Bill 2004 (Cth) in the House of Representatives Main Committee, 
the then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs said: 
Fundamentally, the reason we are here today is passport security. Passport 
security has always been a fundamental matter of national security. In 
today’s uncertain international environment, passport security has taken on 
a renewed focus. The scourge of international terrorism and the devious 
means by which terrorists seek to mete out their carnage on innocent 
civilians globally mean that we can never relent in pursuit of new 
technology applications to improve and tighten security around our passport 
system — consistent, however, with the nation’s longstanding traditions of 
civil liberties.98
The Second Reading Speeches delivered by then Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer and his Opposition counterpart Kevin Rudd for the Australian 
Passports Bill 2004 (Cth) were remarkably similar in structure and content. 
Both major parties were pleased with the legislation they were about to enact. 
The Bill had already passed the House of Representatives back on 4 August 
2004, but it had not gone further than its second reading in the Senate when 
parliament was prorogued for the 2004 Federal election. The Bill was 
reintroduced to parliament after the election, with only a few amendments. 
With both major parties behind it, the Bill passed uneventfully. 
 
Mr Downer, in his Second Reading Speech, asserted that the new legislation 
would achieve three main objectives: to maintain the highest integrity of the 
Australian passport system; to ensure that passport law was complementary to 
national security, border security, and Australian and international law 
enforcement measures and cooperation; and to be consistent with Australian 
family law, privacy and administrative law principles.99
A Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) 
 
In 2003, the Passports Branch of DFAT had concluded, in a departmental 
review paper, that:  
                                                 
98 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives Main Committee, 8 December 
2004, 160 (Kevin Rudd, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
99 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 13–
14 (Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs). This was also the view expressed by 
Kevin Rudd, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, above n 98, 157–62, and Bruce Baird MP, 
Liberal Member for Cook, NSW, above n 98, 162–4, in their Second Reading speeches in 
support of the Bill. 
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The Act, as it now stands, also does not adequately support the activities of 
the Passports Branch in the fight against identity fraud and misuse of 
Australian travel documents. Penalties imposed by the Act are not a 
sufficient deterrent and need to be increased to at least bring them into line 
with those contained in the Migration and Crimes Acts.100
The Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) (APA 2005) came into effect on  
1 July 2005. It sought to ‘balance the citizen’s sense of entitlement to a 
passport’
 
101 with the government’s duty to protect Australia. The Act allows 
the government to refuse to issue passports to criminals, terrorists, persons 
using false identities, and to children lacking appropriate parental supervision 
or relevant court sanction to travel, and to cancel passports once issued. It also 
established the legal framework for the biometric passport.102
For the first time, Australian citizens — by virtue of section 7(1) of the new 
Act — were ‘entitled, on application to the Minister, to be issued with an 
Australian passport by the Minister’.
 
103 However, the Minister needed to be 
satisfied as to the identity and citizenship of the applicant.104 The Act also 
empowered the Department to request information from other Commonwealth 
and state agencies to confirm an applicant’s identity.105
The new Act also changed the basis upon which ministerial discretion 
operated. It now prescribes in detail the circumstances where the Minister, or 
his delegate, may (or must) refuse or cancel a passport.
 
106 It also makes those 
decisions107 reviewable under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 
(Cth) (AATA 1975).108
1 Security and Law Enforcement 
 
The Act makes it clear that ‘[i]f a competent authority makes a request under 
[section 12](1), the Minister must not issue an Australian passport to the 
person’.109
                                                 
100 Australian Passports Office, above n 62. 
 There is no discretion to issue a passport when a ‘competent 
101 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 216. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 7(1). 
104 Ibid s 8. 
105 Ibid s 42. 
106 Ibid Division 2 of Part 2, especially ss 11–17. 
107 And other specified decisions. 
108 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) ss 48–50. 
109 Ibid s 12(2) (emphasis added). 
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authority’ believes on reasonable grounds that an applicant for a passport is 
‘the subject of an arrest warrant issued in Australia in respect of an indictable 
offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory,’ or is 
‘prevented from travelling internationally’ by a court order, parole, or order 
or law of the Commonwealth.110
The APA 2005 defines ‘competent authority’ very broadly: ‘a person who has 
responsibility for, or powers, functions or duties in relation to, [the relevant] 
circumstance under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory’ or is 
‘specified in a Minister’s determination as a competent authority in relation to 
the circumstance.’
  
111 To be ‘prevented from travelling internationally’ 
includes being: ‘(a) required to remain in Australia; and (b) required to 
surrender an Australian passport; and (c) not permitted to apply for an 
Australian passport; and (d) not permitted to obtain an Australian passport.’112
It is noteworthy that the Act leaves the Minister with discretion regarding 
requests by a competent authority in respect of: foreign arrest warrants 
regarding a ‘serious foreign offence’; or, restrictions on travelling imposed by 
a foreign court or foreign law; or, in circumstances where issuing a passport is 
likely to compromise foreign proceedings regarding that person’s involvement 
or alleged involvement in a ‘serious foreign offence’.
 
113
The relevant ‘competent authorit[ies]’ include DFAT officers, Australian 
consular officers
  
114 or diplomatic staff,115 members of the AFP, customs 
officers,116
                                                 
110 Ibid s 12(1). 
 and police officers of an Australian state or territory. It also 
111 For example, the Minister’s determination, Australian Passports Determination 2005, 
defines competent authorities for Australian law enforcement matters to be the Attorney-
General (AG), the Secretary of the AGs Department, and SES employees of that department 
(at s 3.1) for Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 12(3)(b). 
112 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 12(3). 
113 Ibid s 13(1).  
114 Within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature 
24 April 1963, [1973] ATS 7. 
115 Within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for 
signature 24 April 1964, [1968] ATS 3 (entered into force 25 February 1968). 
116 ‘Officer of Customs’ is defined by the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 4(1).  
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includes ‘an agency117 ... that is specified in a Minister’s determination as a 
competent authority in relation to the circumstance.’118
A ‘serious foreign offence’ is, inter alia, an offence with a maximum penalty 
of death or imprisonment for not less than 12 months;
 
119 or which would have 
been an indictable offence against the APA 2005 or another law of the 
Commonwealth (and specified in a Minister’s determination).120
The Minister has discretion to cancel or refuse to issue a passport where a 
competent authority has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is ‘likely 
to engage in conduct ... prejudic[ial to] the security of Australia or a foreign 
country,’ or ‘might endanger the health or physical safety of other persons’, or 
‘might interfere with the rights or freedoms
 These 
categories encompass most foreign offences regarding serious fraud, and 
terrorism, espionage, and other threats to national security.  
121 of other persons’ or if the 
person’s conduct might constitute an indictable offence under the APA 2005 
or another law of the Commonwealth ‘specified in a Minister’s 
determination.’122 In practice, this means offences relating to national and 
international security (including terrorism), illicit drugs, paedophilia or child 
pornography, or violent offences,123
Until the 1980s, there was strong resistance amongst Australian passport 
authorities to the involvement of the Passport Office in direct law 
enforcement. Following the Stewart Royal Commission, passport authorities 
have played an increasing role in detecting identity fraud and associated 
criminal activities, and in passing relevant information to law enforcement 
agencies. After 2001, this role has expanded in concert with increasing 
 rather than acts which interfere with 
‘rights or freedoms’ such as privacy. 
                                                 
117 Within the meaning of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cth). 
Section 5 of that Act defines an ‘agency’ as (a) a Department of State, including its personnel; 
or (b) a Department of Parliament, including its personnel; or (c) a prescribed Agency. 
118 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 13(3). For international law enforcement cooperation, 
the Australian Passports Determination 2005 specifies, the Secretary of the AGs Department, 
and SES employees of that department (s 3.2(1)), or the Australian Federal Police (s3.2(2)(a)), 
or ‘the Australian Trade Commission, to the extent that is performs consular functions within 
the consular district of Vancouver, Canada’ (s 3.2(b)). 
119 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 13(3). 
120 Ibid s 14(1)(a)(v), via s 13(3). 
121 The relevant rights or freedoms being those recognised in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Australian Treaty Series 1980 No 23. 
122 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 14(1). 
123 See Australian Passports Determination 2005, Schedule 1. 
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regional cooperation124
The Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) provides for greater cooperation 
between DFAT and Australasian law enforcement agencies. By 2004, 
Australia was exchanging passport information with countries with high 
traveller volumes to and from Australia. This exchange was pursued to 
improve the detection and prevention of the use of lost, stolen, cancelled, or 
otherwise invalid passports; and to facilitate travel overseas by Australians by 
enabling the Advance Passenger Processing scheme between partner 
countries. The new Act clarified the powers and responsibilities of agencies 
and the Minister with respect to these arrangements.
 between passport and immigration authorities and law 
enforcement agencies. 
125
It is important, in our view, that the government continues to ensure that 
Australia’s travel documents stay at the forefront of document security.
 
126
The Opposition Foreign Affairs spokesman, Mr Rudd, was pleased to support 
the new legislation package as a measure that would reduce the problems 
flowing from lost or stolen passports.
 
127 However, neither he nor Mr Downer 
offered any specifics regarding how the new laws would achieve this goal, 
beyond assertions that the incorporation of emerging technologies (such as 
facial biometrics) would help address identity fraud.128
The new laws were also designed to complement other arrangements, such as 
those that had then recently been announced by Mr Downer at the APEC joint 
ministerial meeting regarding the trial of a regional ‘movement alert system’. 
This system enables border protection officials in the USA and Australia to 
check passenger records and address lost or stolen passport issues.
 
129
The Australian Passports Act was part of Australia’s response to issues 
arising out of international security and international terrorism.
 
130
                                                 
124 Including increased coordination and cooperation regarding efforts to counter drug 
trafficking, people smuggling, terrorism, and other international criminal activities. 
 Both major 
parties agreed that the new legislation was intended to enhance security, while 
125 Doulman and Lee, above n 2, 218. 
126 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 2004, 157–
61 (Kevin Rudd). 
127 Ibid 157–8. 
128 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 14 
(Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
129 Ibid 13. 
130 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 2004, 160 
(Kevin Rudd). 
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maintaining community confidence that it would also adequately protect 
personal information.131
2 Privacy and Security 
 
The key mechanism for protecting personal information under 
Commonwealth law is the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). This Act sets out a regime 
for the protection of ‘personal information’, which is defined in section 6 as  
information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part 
of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form 
or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be 
ascertained, from the information or opinion.132
The disclosure of personal information for the purposes of the Australian 
Passports Act 2005 is addressed in Division 1 of Part 5 of the Act. Section 42 
explicitly links the Act with the Privacy Act. It provides that, when persons 
are requested or directed to provide information, ‘the disclosure of 
information by a person in response to a request or direction ... is taken to be a 
disclosure that is required or authorised by law’
 
133 for the purposes of the 
Privacy Act134
Both major parties were satisfied that these privacy measures provide a 
‘transparent mechanism for obtaining information for identity and citizenship 
verification, and to regulate the disclosure of passport information for limited 
purposes’.
 (or similar state or territory regime). 
135 The mechanism includes arrangements for requesting 
information from private sector organisations.136
                                                 
131 Ibid 158; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 
2004, 13-14 (Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
 However, many of the 
obligations placed upon disclosing organisations under the Privacy Act 
regarding obtaining the consent of, or providing notice to, individuals 
regarding the disclosure of their personal information to third parties are the 
subject of specific exemptions in the APA 2005. 
132 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6. 
133 Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) s 42(3). 
134 Ibid s 42(3) refers at subclause (a) to ‘paragraph (1)(d) of Information Privacy Principle 11 
in section 14’ and at subclause (b) to ‘paragraph 2.1(g) of National Privacy Principle 2 in 
Schedule 3 to the’ Privacy Act. 
135 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 2004, 158 
(Kevin Rudd).  
136 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 14 
(Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs). 
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Parliament removed from the APA specific references to disclosure of 
passport information for national security purposes. It was agreed that these 
matters were already covered adequately in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).137 
Clause 46 of the Bill (section 46 of the Act) provides a statutory regime for 
specified disclosures. Clause 46(d) of the Bill was removed because both the 
government and the opposition were satisfied that the clause would be 
potentially duplicative and introduce unnecessary ambiguity.138 The Privacy 
Act 1988 does not apply to the personnel or operations of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) or the Australian Secret 
Intelligence Service (ASIS); these agencies report to the Inspector General of 
Intelligence Services (IGIS) and to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security.139
VII BALANCING PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
  
Both the Howard Liberal/National coalition government and the Labor 
opposition agreed that the new Act adequately balanced (individual) privacy 
and (community) security. However, where privacy and security interests 
overlap, security usually prevails. If a security, intelligence or law 
enforcement entity requests a disclosure, the normal practice is to disclose, 
often without the individual being notified or consenting. 
Privacy and security are often cast as competing interests: my desire for 
privacy against your need for security. Security is usually regarded as the 
more important objective — one cannot have privacy without security, and 
there is no point having privacy if one is not safe enough to enjoy it. 
However, privacy and security are perceptions. They are not facts. One cannot 
quantify how much privacy or how much security one has. One can measure 
how secure one feels, or assess the risks associated with securing one’s 
environment in particular ways. This does not measure how secure one is or is 
not — only how probable a threat to one’s security might be, in the light of 
specified risk factors. It is not possible to be certain about these assessments 
as it is not possible to have perfect knowledge of a situation. 
                                                 
137 Ibid 14. 
138 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 2004, 158 
(Kevin Rudd).  
139 At the time of these deliberations, the committee was the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
ASIO, ASIS and DSD. The name was changed on 2 December 2005. 
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This is not to say that it is pointless trying to assess risks — to identify as 
many factors as you can and estimate their probable impact and likelihood of 
occurring. Insurance, stock markets, public health, and public policy in 
general are founded upon this kind of assessment. This enables efforts to 
reduce or mitigate risks and their attendant consequences. Risk assessment 
requires the identification of events or circumstances of concern, and 
consideration of what could be done to reduce the likelihood of them 
occurring, or, if they occur, to reduce their negative impacts.140
Technologies designed to implement and maintain security measures are 
important tools for implementing and maintaining privacy, but they are not 
sufficient. Privacy is a concern of individuals about themselves, their 
personal, social and emotional integrity. Security has more to do with control 
over physical place, space, and self. Security protects existence, but privacy is 
required to enjoy that existence; privacy is a concern of governments, cultures 
and societies, but it is experienced by individuals. 
 The 
development of security-enhancing and privacy-enhancing technologies is 
recognition of the potential for some events and behaviours to put us (or our 
property) at risk, and that something can, and perhaps ought, to be done to 
prevent them. 
A Biometrics and Privacy versus Security 
The APA 2005 provides a new legal framework for the use of technology in 
relation to the issuing of passports. The Minister for Foreign Affairs may 
adopt suitable methods or technologies for identification and other purposes. 
Section 47 of the Act requires that a minister’s determination for use of 
technologies (for example, facial biometrics) specify: (1) the nature of the 
information to be collected (eg a biometric — the photo provided with a 
passport application); and (2) the purpose for which it may be used (to assist 
the identification of fraudulent passport applications, and fraudulent use of 
passports).141
The Australian government chose facial recognition as the appropriate 
biometric tool for its passport system. Facial recognition was considered least 
intrusive — and easiest to comply with — as it only requires passport bearers 
to submit to having their photograph taken; something they were already used 
 
                                                 
140 Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, AS/NZ 4360:2004 Risk Management 
(2004). 
141 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 2 December 2004, 13 
(Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 8 December 2004, 158 (Kevin Rudd). 
2011 THE AUSTRALIAN PASSPORT SYSTEM 357 
to doing for previous passports and for other forms of (official) identification 
documents. This choice also enabled the Australian passport system to 
leverage the existing extensive collection of digitised photographs of passport 
applicants held by the Passport Office.142
Biometric technologies use statistical processes to generate a numerical value 
or model from a person’s physical or behavioural characteristic that can be 
compared by a computer.
  
143 They are not, and cannot, be perfect. Errors 
leading to positive matches (false positives) or negative matches (false 
negatives) will occur. Even if reduced to small fractions of a percent, when 
applied to large populations of travellers over time, sizable numbers of 
persons will be inconvenienced as authorities attempt to confirm their 
identification. The error rate depends upon the quality of the biometric 
measurement captured by the system (how accurate, and precise it is),144 and 
its ability to differentiate between similar enrolees (eg very similar looking 
people).145
Facial recognition systems attempt to match features in images of faces 
against a database of pre-recorded, known faces. The images are not directly 
compared. Computer software identifies as many as eighty facial features in 
an image and generates a mathematical model that represents the relationships 
between those features (distance, depth, and direction). This model is stored 
with other details about the person. When a face is presented to the system, a 
  
                                                 
142 Some 12 million images at the introduction of the ePassport system. 
143 Anil K Jain, Arun Ross and Salil Prabhakar, ‘An Introduction to Biometric Recognition’ 
(2004) 14(1) IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology 4; Joseph N 
Pato and Lynette I Millett (eds), Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities 
(National Academic Press, 2010). 
144 Accuracy and precision are not the same thing. The accuracy of a measurement relates to 
how close it is to the actual (true) value being measured. Statistically, accuracy is the 
proportion of true results (both true positives and true negatives) in the total population of 
measurements. The fewer false positives and false negatives, the more accurate the 
measurement, and the closer any particular measurement is likely to be to the true value being 
measured. The precision of a measurement relates to how many repeated measurements 
(under the same conditions) will produce the exact same value. It is the proportion of true 
positives against all positive results — both true positives and false positives. The fewer false 
positives, the more precise the measurement. Accuracy is how close a measurement is to the 
true value (how close the mean of measures is to the true value), while precision is how close 
the next measurement of the same thing will be to the current measurement (the magnitude of 
the standard deviation of measurements from the mean). 
145 Michael E Schuckers, ‘A Parametric Correlation Framework for the Statistical Evaluation 
and Estimation of Biometric-Based Classification Performance in a Single Environment’ 
(2009) 4 (2) IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 231; ‘The Difference 
Engine: Dubious Security’, The Economist (online), 1 October 2010, <http://www. 
economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/10/biometrics>. 
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mathematical model of the face is generated. It is this model that is compared 
against one or more already known to the system. Matches are determined 
based upon statistically adequate similarity between the model of the face 
presented and those ‘matched’ in the database. 
The Australian passport system relies upon a comparison between the person 
presenting and a record stored on the passport they present at a SmartGate. 
This is potentially a many-to-one comparison: comparing the person 
presenting the passport with the single record on the passport requires the 
system to be able to distinguish the real subject from many similar looking 
people. The system handles failures to (adequately) achieve this match by 
diverting the person to manual handling.146
Questions have been raised about the efficacy of biometric measures as 
authenticators or as identifiers.
 
147 Biometrics may be inadequate for 
identifying ‘known’ individuals out of a large pool of unknown persons, 
which is required to discover a known ‘person of interest’ who is travelling 
under an assumed or stolen identity. Concerns have been raised about how 
adequately the quality of captured biometric data is measured, and the 
mechanisms by which data are compared with actual people.148
‘Security-critical’ systems, particularly those considered essential to national 
security, such as the passport SmartGate, are often shrouded in secrecy. This 
inhibits meaningful independent evaluation and verification of the design and 
the effectiveness of the system. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner, the 
Australian federal privacy agency, released an unclassified version of their 
2007 Privacy Audit of the SmartGate system. While its recommendations are 
intact, specific details of the system that were considered sensitive for law 
enforcement and security reasons were withheld at the request of Customs.
 
149
                                                 
146 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, How It Works (2009) 
<http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page5831.asp> ; Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service, SmartGate — Frequently asked questions (2010) <http://www.customs. 
gov.au/site/page5555.asp>. 
 
147 Joseph N Pato and Lynette I Millett (eds), Biometric Recognition: Challenges and 
Opportunities (National Acadamies Press, 2010); Jay Stanley and Barry Steinhardt, Drawing 
a Blank: The Failure of Facial Recognition Technology in Tampa, Florida (2002) American 
Civil Liberities Union <http://www.biometrie-online.net/images/stories/dossiers/technique/ 
visage/drawing_blank.pdf>; ‘The Difference Engine’, above n 145. 
148 Roger Clarke, Biometrics’ Inadequacies and Threats, and the Need for Regulation (2002) 
Xamax Consultancy <http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/BiomThreats.html>; Pato and Millett, 
above n 146. 
149 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, SmartGate Automated Border Processing: Final Audit 
Report (2007). 
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In his review of biometric systems, Roger Clarke argues that they must not be 
used unless and until a comprehensive and strictly enforced regulatory scheme 
is in place. This scheme must require openness of their design and 
implementation, with independent testing and verification of published results 
and privacy impact assessments before field tests or deployment of production 
systems take place, and a commitment to privacy-sensitive/privacy-aware 
system architectures.150
False positives can result in people being treated as if they were criminals 
‘just in case’. But a match by the system is not proof that the person matched 
is indeed the person of interest, nor does a failure to match prove otherwise. 
Computers can only indicate that two sets of data are similar enough, or 
dissimilar enough, according to criteria programmed into them. 
 
It is crucial to recognise, therefore, that biometrics do not and cannot address 
the quality of the information in any record that may be associated with the 
biometric. Biometrics cannot ensure that the record with which they are 
associated contains accurate, or current, information regarding the person 
from whom the biometric is derived. 
Privacy law is largely concerned with identification and identity data. We 
refer to this as ‘information privacy’. It prescribes limits on the acquisition 
and use of information that can be used to identify individuals.151
VIII CONCLUSION 
 This can put 
it at odds with security and law enforcement agencies which increasingly 
demand more and better identification and surveillance of individuals. 
Governments have to manage these competing interests, but it may be more 
fruitful to look for synergies between privacy and security. Understanding the 
limits of identification and the means available to identify individuals 
provides a sound foundation upon which to (re)consider the balance made 
between privacy and security in these critical information infrastructure and 
national security systems. 
Over the past thirty years, the balance between privacy and security in 
Australia’s passport system has shifted from concern for the privacy of 
individuals towards broader national security interests. This has been 
                                                 
150 Clarke, above n 148. 
151 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Final Report No 108 (2008). 
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cemented in the last decade by an emphasis on anti-terrorism measures that 
are reflected in security policies. 
Governments around the world are looking to establish ‘gold standard’ 
identity credentials as part of their national security (anti-terrorism) strategies. 
As part of this effort, they are looking to biometric technologies to enable 
conclusive association between a ‘secure’ credential and a single individual. 
Biometric technologies establish a statistical profile of certain physical 
characteristics which are matched against those of persons presenting 
themselves to a system in order to either confirm or deny a match. These and 
other new technologies are being deployed to improve security by identifying 
fraudulent documents and potentially dangerous ‘persons of interest’. 
At the same time, the efficacy and social impacts of these technologies are 
being questioned. The technical capacity of systems to evade exploitation or 
to distinguish reliably friend from foe creates an ‘arms race’ between securers 
and exploiters, and has the potential to promote a culture of fear. This is 
compounded by concerns regarding the effects of these technologies upon the 
nature and foundations of social and personal identity, and the relationships 
associated with them. In the rush to nail down everyone’s ‘identity’, or to 
capture the value of it, there is a possibility that the very purpose of having an 
identity will be trampled. Privacy may all too easily be displaced in the rush 
to protect security. 
Privacy is a complex social value. It is not immutable. Thus it is overly 
simplistic to assume that security is always more important. Privacy and 
security often relate to the same social problems, where they interact in 
important ways. They can appear to have different purposes because they 
offer different perspectives on the same concerns. Rather than ‘balancing’ 
privacy against security, it is more fruitful to consider how they interact, and 
where they might reinforce one another. Context is important, and privacy and 
security are both concerned with relationships — and it is within relationships 
that identities (and information regarding them) have meaning. 
